Srobonti Chattopadhyay

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PERSONAL DETAILS:

Birth:	December 23, 1981, Kolkata, India
Nationality:	Indian
Current Position:	Assistant Professor of Economics, Rabindra Bharati University
Institutional Address:	56A, B.T. Road, Kolkata – 700050, West Bengal, India
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PAST TEACHING EXPERIENCES:

- Taught undergraduate (B.A. Hons.) courses as a Full Time lecturer (ad-hoc) in the Department of Economics in **St. Stephen's College**, Delhi (July 16 - September 30, 2008)

- Taught undergraduate (B.A. Hons.) courses as Full Time Assistant Professor (ad-hoc) in **Sri Venkateshwara College**, New Delhi (July 23, 2012 – March 20, 2013)

- Worked as Visiting Scientist in **Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute**, Kolkata (July 1- August 29, 2013) which involved teaching at the postgraduate (MSQE) level

- Worked as Assistant Professor of Economics at Vidyasagar College for Women, Kolkata (May 14, 2014-September 30, 2020)

OTHER WORK EXPERIENCES:

- Worked as a Project Associate (Since January 2, 2012 till July 1,2012) and as a Consultant (Since July 2, 2012 till July 24, 2012) in a project on Unaccounted Income in India, with the **National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi** (the work involved secondary content analysis and mathematical modeling).

- Worked as a Post Doctoral Research Fellow (Since August 30, 2013 till May 14, 2014) at **Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta**, Kolkata (The work relates to analysis of Indian telecom spectrum auctions).

- Taught as a Guest Faculty for two lectures in the PGP course titled **"Economics 101: Microeconomic Theory"** in Term 1, during Academic Year 2014-15 at **Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta**, Kolkata.

- Taught as a Part Time Visiting Faculty (PTVF) at **Indian Institute of Management Calcutta**, Kolkata, the course titled **"EC-252: Auctions: Theory and Practice"** to PGP Term VI students during December 2014- January 2015 (Academic Year 2014-15), to PGP Term IV students during June -July 2015 (Academic Year 2015-16), to PGP Term

VI students during December 2016- January 2017 and PGP Term VI students during December 2017- January 2018.

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS:

- Awarded Ph.D. degree (in November, 2012) from the Centre for Economic Studies & Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (JNU). Title of the thesis: **"Auctions, Strategic Behaviour and Competitive Outcomes".**

- Awarded M. Phil. Degree (in August 2008) from the Centre for Economic Studies & Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (JNU). Title of the thesis: **"Liberalization and Interest Rate Policy in India".** (Final Grade Point Average: 7/9; Approximate 77.78%)

- M.A. in Economics (2005) from the Centre for Studies in Diplomacy, International Law and Economics (presently Centre for International Trade and Development), JNU, New Delhi. (Final Grade Point Average: 7.62/9; Approximate 84.67%)

- B.Sc. (Honours) in Economics (2003) from Bethune College, University of Calcutta. (55.37%)

- Higher Secondary (2000) from Baranagar Rajkumari Memorial Girls' High School, Kolkata, WBCHSE. (85%)

- Secondary (1998) from Ariadaha Sarbamangala Balika Vidyalaya, Kolkata, WBBSE. (91.37%)

RELEVANT QUALIFICATIONS:

- Qualified National Eligibility Test (NET) conducted by University Grants Commission (UGC) in June 2006 for the award of Junior Research Fellowship.

FELLOWSHIP/ SCHOLARSHIP RECEIVED:

- Awarded National Scholarship for the distinction achieved (27th position in the state) in Secondary (Madhyamik) Examination in 1998

- Recipient of Ford Foundation Fellowship from the Centre for Studies in Diplomacy, International Law and Economics, JNU, New Delhi (2003-04).

- Recipient of UGC (National Eligibility Test) Junior Research Fellowship for M Phil/PhD researchers (from November 15, 2006 to November 15, 2008)

- Recipient of UGC (National Eligibility Test) Senior Research Fellowship for PhD researchers (from November 15, 2008 to November 15, 2011).

- Recipient of the Post Doctoral Research Fellowship from Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta (from August 30, 2013 to May 14, 2014).

AREA OF INTEREST:

- Mathematical Modeling and Application of Game Theory (in the areas of Microeconomics, Game Theory, Auction Theory and Industrial Organisation Theory)

PUBLICATIONS: ARTICLES IN JOURNALS

- "Revenue Equivalence in Sequential Auctions" (with Rittwik Chatterjee), (2012) *Economics Bulletin*, Vol. 32 No. 2 pp. 1272-1281.

- "Revenue Comparison among Single-stage, Sequential and Simultaneous Auctions: The Case of Log-concave Distributions" (with Rittwik Chatterjee), (2013), *Journal of Economic Theory and Social Development*, Vol. 1, No.2, pp. 107-126.

- "Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative R&D Incentives under Incomplete Information" (with Tarun Kabiraj), (2015), *Economics of Innovation and New Technology*, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 624-632, Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2014.991138

- "Incomplete Information and R&D Organization" (with Tarun Kabiraj), (2015), Economics Bulletin, Vol. 35, Issue 1, pp.14-20.

- "Collaborative Research and Rate of Interests" (with Rittwik Chatterjee), (2015), Studies in Microeconomics 3.2, pp.140-157, Sage Publications.https://doi.org/10.1177/2321022215588871

- "Revenue comparison between single unified and sequential auctions", (with Rittwik Chatterjee), (2015), Arthabisleshon, Year 3, Issue 1, pp. 43-52. ISSN 2321-1903.

- "R&D in a duopoly under incomplete information" (with Rittwik Chatterjee and Tarun Kabiraj), (2019), International Journal of Economic Theory, 15(4), pp. 341-359. doi: 10.1111/ijet.12174, Wiley (first published 03 August, 2018).

- "Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information" (with Rittwik Chatterjee and Tarun Kabiraj), (2018), Studies in Microeconomics, 6(1-2), pp. 50-56, DOI : 10.1177/2321022218800183, Sage Publications.

- "Patent Protection and R&D Incentives Under Incomplete Information" (with Rittwik Chatterjee), (2019), Journal of Quantitative Economics, 17(3), pp. 699-705 DOI: 10.1007/s40953-018-0153-4, Springer.

- "When Spillovers Enhance R&D Incentives" (with Rittwik Chatterjee and Tarun Kabiraj), (2019) Journal of Quantitative Economics, *17*(4), pp. 857-868 DOI: 10.1007/s40953-019-00161-3, Springer.

- “Innovation and Governance”(with Saurav Roychoudhury and Anuj Bhowmik) (2023), Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 48(1), pages 78-106. DOI:10.1007/s12197-023-09632-z

- "Free Licensing in a Differentiated Duopoly" (with Rittwik Chatterjee and Tarun Kabiraj), (2024), Journal of Quantitative Economics,*22*(3), pp.589-613. DOI: 10.1007/s40953-024-00406-w

PUBLICATIONS: BOOK CHAPTERS/BOOKS

- “Assessing the Macroeconomic and Welfare Impacts of Global Rice Trade Liberalisation for India” (with Nitesh Sahay), (2008), in “Global Rice and Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: Poverty and Welfare Implications for South Asia”, Edited by Mohammad A. Razzaque and Edward Laurent (Published by the Commonwealth Secretariat).

- “Auctions with Synergy” (with Rittwik Chatterjee), (2014) in “Perspectives on Efficiency, Growth and Economic Inequality”, Edited by Satish K. Jain and Anjan Mukherji (Published by Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, New Delhi).

- “Understanding Auctions” (2020) (with Rittwik Chatterjee), Routledge Focus Series, Taylor and Francis Group.

- “Covid-19 pandemic and migrant workers: India and the world”, in “THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, INDIA AND THE WORLD”, Edited by Rajib Bhattacharyya, Ananya Ghosh Dastidar and Soumyen Sikdar, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group) Headquartered at Milton Park, Abingdon-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, England, UK (2022), ISBN 9781032 114965.

PAPERS PRESENTED IN SEMINARS:

- “Revenue Comparison between Single-Stage and Sequential Auctions” presented on March 22, 2010, in JNU-NIPFP-CIGI Conference on "Economic Theory, Markets and Institutions of Governance", in New Delhi.

- “Financial Crisis and Degree of Openness of Countries: Some Case Studies” (with Tanaya Sinha and Rittwik Chatterjee) presented on December, 17, 2010, in IIFT conference on “Empirical Issues in International Trade and Finance”, in New Delhi

- “Subdivided Multiple Unit Auctions” presented on March 12, 2012, in JNU, CESP Young Scholars’ Seminar, in New Delhi.

- “Auctions with Synergy” (with Rittwik Chatterjee) presented on March 29, 2012, in JNU-NIPFP 2012 Economic Theory and Policy Conference, in New Delhi.

- “Selling a Technological Innovation through Auction in an Oligopolistic Industry” (with Rittwik Chatterjee) presented on August 18, 2012, in the “11th Meeting of Society for Social Choice and Welfare”, in New Delhi.

- "Interdependent Markets and Auction of Entry Rights", Presented on March 21, 2013, presented in JNU-NIPFP 6th Economic Theory and Policy Conference, in New Delhi.

- “Selling a Technological Innovation through Auction in a Duopolistic Industry”, presented on April 18, 2013, in Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata.

- “High Technology Products Exports by India and China: A Constant Market Share Analysis” (with Rittwik Chatterjee), presented on January 3, 2014, in Conference on “Economic Aspects of Public Policy” Organized by Centre for Advanced Studies, Department of Economics, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.

- “Sequential Auctions with Waiting Costs”, presented on February 20, 2014, in the 7th Economic Theory and Policy Conference, jointly organized by NIPFP, JNU, and Faculty of Economics, Kagawa University, in New Delhi.

- “Competition and Auctioning of Licenses”, presented on December 23, 2015, in the XXVth Annual Conference on Contemporary Issues in Development Economics, Department of Economics, Jadavpur University, Kolkataheld during 22-23 December, 2015

- “R&D in Duopoly Under Incomplete Information”, presented on December 14, 2016 at 11th Winter School held at Delhi School of Economics, during December 13-15, 2016.

- “Spillover and R&D Incentives Under Incomplete Information in a Duopoly Industry”, presented on December 19, 2017 at 13th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development held at Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi during December 18-20, 2017.

- “Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information”, presented on February 22, 2018 at Economic Theory and Policy Conference held at Centre for Development Studies, Kerala during February 22-23, 2018.

- “R&D Incentives Under Incomplete Information and Uncertainty About Success”, presented on August 18, 2018 at Conference on New Directions in Economic Theory and Empirical Economics held at Indian Institute of Management Calcutta during August 17-18, 2018.

- “When Spillovers Enhance R&D Incentives”, presented on February 14, 2019 at Conference on Economic Theory and Policy held at Centre for Development Studies, Kerala during February 14-15, 2018.

- “Innovation and the role of Governance”, presented on December 17, 2019 at XXIX-th Annual Conference on Contemporary Issues in Development Economics at Jadavpur University during December 16-17, 2019.

- “R&D incentives under incomplete information and uncertainty about success”, presented on December 18, 2019 at Finance and Economics Conference (FINECON) 2019 at International Management Institute Kolkata during December 17-18, 2019.

WORKING PAPERS:

- “Telecom Spectrum Auctions in India: The Theory and the Practice” (with Susmita Chatterjee), (2014), Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, Working Paper Series, WPS No. 741/February, 2014

- “Sequential Auctions with Waiting Costs”, (2014), Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, Working Paper Series, WPS No. 741/February, 2014

WORK IN PROGRESS:

- **Subdivided Multiple Unit Auctions**: This note makes an attempt to look at subdivided multiple unit auctions by considering two specific examples involving N bidders and 3 units of a homogeneous indivisible object: first, where 2 units are offered for sale in the first stage and 1 unit in the second stage and second, where 1 unit is offered for sale in the first stage and 2 units in the second stage when bidders’ valuations distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. The results derived show that no perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists for both the cases considered here.

- **Selling a Technological Innovation through Auction in an Oligopolistic Industry**: This paper considers a two-stage game, where in the first stage, two firms bid non-cooperatively for a production technique that leads to a reduction in cost. Following the auction in the second stage of the game these firms compete against each other in a duopolistic industry. This paper makes an attempt to figure out the welfare implications of the bid disclosure policies under different parametric and market conditions.

- **Interdependent Markets and Auction of Entry Rights:** This paper considers a duopolistic market consisting of two identical firms producing and selling a homogeneous product and involved in Cournot competition. There is a second market, where any one of these firms can be a potential entrant and act as a monopolist in that market subject to entry. There is interdependence among the two markets in the sense that the firm that operates in both the markets experiences some cost advantage or disadvantage. The right to enter the second market is sold through the auction of a license. The degree of interdependence parameter for each firm (reflected in its cost function when it operates in both the markets) is private information and constitutes type. This paper assumes the types to be independently and identically distributed over the same interval following the same continuous distribution function. A simple example involving a first price sealed bid auction shows that a symmetric increasing equilibrium bid function always exists when there are cost advantages from operating in both the markets, whereas for very high levels of cost disadvantages, such an equilibrium may not exist.

- **Sequential Auctions with Waiting Costs**: This paper makes an attempt to analyse the auction of the types of goods, for which multiple unit auctions have to be conducted sequentially. In such sequential auctions, there may be waiting costs involved for the bidders. It considers a situation where waiting costs are private information. The results derived suggest that, in a symmetric, independent, private valuations framework, with risk neutral bidders, there exists a symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy, for which the bids are increasing in types in the first stage and decreasing in types in the second stage.

PROJECTS:

- Submitted a University Research Project titled "**DIGITALISATION OF NON-TEXT BOOK PUBLICATION INDUSTRY: SOME EVIDENCES FROM A BOOK MARKET IN KOLKATA**" at Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata in 2025.

COMPUTER KNOWLEDGE:

Working platforms: Windows, Linux.

LANGUAGE SKILLS:

Bengali – native language.

English – speak fluently and read/write with high proficiency.

Hindi – speak and read with basic competence.

REFEREE:

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